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Lecture 12: Randomized Asynchronous Agreement

CS 539 / ECE 526

Distributed Algorithms

Announcements

- PS2 graded and solution sketch uploaded.
Regrade requests due tonight.
- P3 due this Friday
- Review lecture next Monday
- Midterm in lecture next Wednesday
 - In class, on Canvas, open book

What can we do about FLP?

- Consider easier problems
- Randomization
- Consider easier models (partial synchrony)
- Agreement, total order bcast, and replication possible in psync or async with randomization
 - Single-value broadcast still impossible

Ben-Or Protocol

- The first randomized async agreement (1983)
 - Tolerate $f < n/2$ crash faults
 - Best possible in psync / async
 - Binary inputs
 - Asynchronous Binary Agreement (ABA)
- Supposed to be simple (still is relatively), but turns out to be much trickier

Ben-Or ABA Protocol

- Party j has input x_j . Will keep updating x_j

Iteration r :

- Round 1: party j sends $(r, \text{vote1}, x_j)$ to all
 - Wait for $n-f$ such msgs
- Round 2: if all $n-f$ vote1 are for the same x , party j sends $(r, \text{vote2}, x)$; else, sends $(r, \text{vote2}, \perp)$
 - Wait for $n-f$ such msgs
- If all $n-f$ vote2 are for the same x , then decide x ;
Else if there is one vote2 for x , then set $x_j = x$;
Else, set x_j to 0 or 1 randomly. Go to iteration $r+1$.

Ben-Or ABA Protocol

- Party j has input x_j . Will keep updating x_j

Iteration r :

- $(y, g) \leftarrow \text{GA}_r(x_j)$ // 2-round GA
- If $g == 1$, then decide y ;
 Else if $y \neq \perp$, $x_j \leftarrow y$;
 Else, $x_j \leftarrow$ a random bit
- Go to iteration $r+1$

Recall Graded Agreement (GA)

- Party j has input x_j :
 - Round 1: party j sends $(\text{vote1}, x_j)$
 - Wait for $n-f$ vote1 msgs
 - Round 2: if all $n-f$ vote1 are for the same x , party j sends $(\text{vote2}, x)$; else, sends $(\text{vote2}, \perp)$
 - Wait for $n-f$ vote2 msgs
 - If all $n-f$ vote2 are for the same x , then output $(x, 1)$;
Else if there is one vote2 for x , then output $(x, 0)$;
Else, output $(\perp, 0)$.

Recall Graded Agreement (GA)

- n parties, each with an input, up to f faulty
- Each party outputs value y and “grade” bit g
 - g is roughly “confidence”
- Liveness: everyone outputs
- Validity: same inputs $x \rightarrow$ all output $(x, 1)$
- Two safety guarantees:
 - S2: One outputs $(y, 1)$, all output $(y, *)$
 - S3: No $(y, *)$ and $(y', *)$ for $y \neq y'$, $y \neq \perp$, $y' \neq \perp$

Termination Gadget

- As written, the protocol does not have a termination rule
- Termination gadget for crash faults:
 - Upon deciding x , send “decide x ” to all and terminate
 - Upon receiving “decide x ”, send “decide x ” to all and terminate

Ben-Or ABA Correctness

- Validity: same inputs $x \rightarrow (x, 1)$ from GA
 - In fact, if all parties start iteration r with $x_j = x$, then all decide x in iteration r
- Safety:
 - One party decides y (for whom GA_r outputs $(y, 1)$)
 - $\rightarrow GA_r$ outputs $(y, *)$ for all parties (GA S2)
 - $\rightarrow$ All set x_j to $y \rightarrow$ All decide y in iteration $r+1$

Ben-Or ABA Correctness

- Liveness:
 - GA S3: No $(y, *)$ and $(y', *)$ for $y \neq y'$, $y \neq \perp$, $y' \neq \perp$
 - Possible outcomes: all \$ (coin), 0 and \$, or 1 and \$
 - If everyone happens to get the same coin flip AND it happens to equal those who adopt GA output ...
 - ... this happens with exponentially small prob
 - then all parties will start with the same value and will decide in next iteration

Ben-Or ABA Efficiency

- Efficient asynchronous randomized protocols use a “common coin” subroutine

Iteration r :

- $(y, g) \leftarrow \text{GA}_r(x_j)$ // 2-round GA
- If $g == 1$, then decide y ;
 Else if $y \neq \perp$, $x_j \leftarrow y$;
- Else, $x_j \leftarrow C_r$ // C_r : r -th common coin
- Go to iteration $r+1$

Ben-Or ABA Efficiency

- With a common coin, want to argue: with probability $\geq \frac{1}{2}$, coin = non- $\perp$ GA output
 - At most one non- $\perp$ GA output
- Hence, decide in expected 2 iterations !?
- Turns out it's not so simple

Ben-Or ABA Liveness

- Let us take a closer look at the protocol

Iteration r :

- $(y_r, g_r) \leftarrow \text{GA}_r(x_j)$ // 2-round GA
- If $g_r == 1$, then decide y_r ;
Else $x_j \leftarrow y_r (\neq \perp)$ or C_r // C_r : r -th common coin
- Go to iteration $r+1$

- Claim: $\Pr[C_r = y_r] = 1/2$

- Implicit assumption: y_r is independent of C_r
- The adversarial network can manipulate message delivery order to make sure $y_r \neq C_r$

Ben-Or ABA Protocol ($n=3, f=1$)

- Party j has input x_j . Will keep updating x_j

Iteration r :

- Round 1: party j sends $(r, \text{vote1}, x_j)$
 - Wait for $n-f = 2$ such msgs
- Round 2: if all $n-f=2$ vote1 are for the same x , party j sends $(r, \text{vote2}, x)$; else, sends $(r, \text{vote2}, ?)$
 - Wait for $n-f = 2$ such msgs
- If all $n-f=2$ vote2 are for the same x , then decide x ;
Else if there is one vote2 for x , then set $x_j = x$;
Else, set x_j to 0 or 1 randomly. Go to iteration $r+1$.

Ben-Or ABA Liveness

- Ben-Or ABA not live if using common coin

– Initially:	0	1	v
– GA_1 :	$\perp$	$1-C_1$	$1-C_1$ if $C_1 = C_2$ $\perp$ if $C_1 \neq C_2$
– Adopt:	C_1	$1-C_1$	$1-C_2$
– GA_2 :	$\perp$	$1-C_2$	
– Adopt:	C_2	$1-C_2$	

- With prob $\frac{1}{2}$, an adversarial network can create an infinite run
 - Need $1-C_1 = v$

Ben-Or ABA Liveness

- Ben-Or ABA not live if using common coin
- Miraculously, it is live with local coins, but very inefficient and requires a complex proof
- Can we make Ben-Or work for common coin?
 - Yes! [Abraham-BenDavid-Yandamuri, 2022]
 - Idea: prevent manipulation of GA outputs after any party outputs from GA

Need Additional Property in GA

- Liveness: everyone outputs
- Validity: same inputs $x \rightarrow$ all output $(x, 1)$
- Two safety:
 - S2: One outputs $(y, 1)$, all output $(y, *)$
 - S3: No $(y, *)$ and $(y', *)$ for $y \neq y'$, $y \neq \perp$, $y' \neq \perp$
- Binding: once a party outputs, all parties can only output $(\perp, *)$ or $(y, *)$ (for some $y \in \{0, 1\}$)
 - “ $\perp/y$ -valent” as opposed to “tri-valent”

GA with Binding

- Party j has input x_j :
 - Round 1: party j sends $(\text{vote1}, x_j)$
 - Wait for $n-f$ vote1 msgs
 - Round 2: if all $n-f$ vote1 are for the same x , party j sends $(\text{vote2}, x)$; else, sends $(\text{vote2}, \perp)$
 - Wait for $n-f$ vote2 msgs
 - Round 3: if all $n-f$ vote2 are for the same x , party j sends $(\text{vote3}, x)$; else, sends $(\text{vote3}, \perp)$
 - Wait for $n-f$ vote3 msgs
 - If all $n-f$ vote3 are for the same x , then output $(x, 1)$;
Else if there is one vote3 for x , then output $(x, 0)$;
Else, output $(\perp, 0)$.

GA with Binding

- Liveness, validity proofs similar as before
- Safety: quorum intersection $\rightarrow$ at most one non- $\perp$ vote2 **and vote3** $\rightarrow$ both S2 and S3
- Binding: once a party outputs, all parties can only output $(\perp, *)$ or $(y, *)$ (for some $y \in \{0,1\}$)
 - Consider the first time some party sends vote3
 - This is before any party outputs
 - Consider the n-f vote2 received by this party
 - If one has $v \neq \perp \rightarrow$ no other non- $\perp$ vote2 $\rightarrow$ binding
 - If n-f (vote2, $\perp$) $\rightarrow$ everyone receives a (vote2, $\perp$) $\rightarrow$ everyone sends (vote3, $\perp$) $\rightarrow$ binding (only $\perp$)

Modern Ben-Or ABA Correctness

- Liveness:
 - Possible outcomes: all \$ (coin), 0 and \$, or 1 and \$
 - By the time coin is revealed, the outcome for this iteration is already fixed (GA binding)
 - If all coins == adopted value (if any), then all parties start with same value and decide in next iteration
 - 2^{-n} prob with local coin, $\frac{1}{2}$ prob with common coin

Modern Ben-Or ABA Efficiency

- In expectation, $O(2^n)$ iterations with local coins and $O(1)$ iterations with common coin
- Rounds: $O(1)$ times expected # of iteration
- Communication complexity: $O(n^2)$ times expected # of iteration

Summary

- Ben-Or protocol: randomized asynchronous binary agreement tolerating $f < n/2$ crash
- Randomization circumvents FLP
- Also circumvents $f+1$ round lower bound